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INTRODUCTION
Since graduating from high school with a 3.9 GPA, Damian Stinnie has bounced
around in various retail jobs.1 In December 2012, he lost a job at Walmart and began
a search that lasted four months, ultimately taking a position as a sales clerk at
Abercrombie & Fitch.2 During those four months, he received four traffic citations
issued by various Virginia courts.3 Between April and July 2013, Mr. Stinnie was con-
victed on three of these citations, which resulted in over $700 in fines and $288 in
administrative fees owed to the courts.4 On the fourth charge, which was dismissed,
Mr. Stinnie was nevertheless assessed $10 in court costs, for a total of $1,002 owed
to the Virginia court system.5
Mr. Stinnie’s employment began just as these costs were imposed.6 At Abercrom-
bie, Mr. Stinnie earned minimum wage, totaling approximately $300 a week—a gen-
erous estimate, according to a complaint filed on his behalf against the Commissioner
of the Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV).7 When the fines and fees were
assessed by the courts, no inquiry was made by the courts into Mr. Stinnie’s ability to
pay, nor was he given any financing options other than immediate payment.8
Thirty-five days after the fees were assessed on May 20, 2013, the Virginia
DMV suspended Mr. Stinnie’s driver’s license automatically.9 Then, on May 27, 2013,
he was cited for driving with a suspended license, completely unaware that his li-
cense had been suspended.10 For this violation, Mr. Stinnie was assessed an additional
* JD Candidate, William & Mary Law School, 2018. BA, University of Notre Dame, 2010.
I would like to extend a thank you to the staff of the William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal
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1 Class Action Complaint at 7, Stinnie v. Holcomb, 2017 WL 963234 (W.D. Va. Mar. 13,
2017) (No. 3:16-cv-00044-NKM), appeal filed, No. 17-1740 (4th Cir. June 16, 2017).
2 Id.
3 Id. at 7–8.
4 Id. at 8.
5 Id.
6 Id. at 7–8.
7 See id. at 8 (“Mr. Stinnie’s hours varied, but he consistently worked less than full time
and always earned minimum wage.”).
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id. at 9.
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$302 in fines and court costs.11 Once again, the court did not inquire into his ability
to pay these costs.12
A few months later, Mr. Stinnie was diagnosed with lymphoma; he then went
through a stem cell transplant and chemotherapy, but remained in fragile condition.13
He pooled resources with his brother and bounced around from place to place,
nonetheless becoming homeless for some short periods of time.14 Due to his poor
health and occasional homelessness, he became eligible for a guaranteed housing pro-
gram in Charlottesville, Virginia, and moved there with his brother, who was working
odd jobs.15 They also collaborated in the purchase of a used car, which provided Mr.
Stinnie’s brother transportation to get to his jobs and Mr. Stinnie some security and
stability in his unreliable housing situation.16
Mr. Stinnie was pulled over once again on January 1, 2016, which resulted in
another conviction for driving with a suspended license.17 During this trial, the court
determined that he was indigent for the purposes of obtaining representation and
assigned a lawyer to him.18 He spent a weekend in jail as a result of this conviction
and was assessed $257 in fees and court costs.19
Mr. Stinnie has not been employed in the years since his cancer diagnosis, sub-
sisting on Supplemental Security Income and food stamps and relying upon placement
in a housing program.20 He frequently missed payments on his car during these years,
but he knew he needed to keep it in the event that his housing placement was revoked.21 
The non-payment of the 2016 fees and costs again resulted in a suspended li-
cense for Mr. Stinnie.22 The Legal Aid Justice Center took on Mr. Stinnie’s case in
the summer of 2016 and filed a class action lawsuit against the Virginia DMV, in
the person of the commissioner, contesting the constitutionality of automatic driver’s
license suspensions for those without the means to pay.23 Commenting on the mat-
ter, Mr. Stinnie said: “I guess people say driving is a privilege, but its really a neces-
sity. . . . Nobody wants to break the law.”24 The suit was subsequently dismissed by
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 10.
15 Id.
16 Id. (“Occasionally, the brothers had to sleep in the car when they were unable to find
another place to stay for the night.”).
17 Id. at 11.
18 Id.
19 Id. at 12.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 12–13.
22 Id. at 12.
23 Id. at 1–2.
24 Man Who Loses License over Court Fines Talk About Implications, NBC 29 WVIR-TV
(Dec. 2, 2016, 5:36 PM), http://www.nbc29.com/story/33856437/man-who-loses-license
-over-court-fines-talk-about-implications.
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the district court for standing and jurisdictional issues, and appeal is pending before
the Fourth Circuit, so the issues on the merits remain to be adjudicated.25
This Note will analyze the constitutional arguments at the center of the case brought
by Mr. Stinnie. It concludes that Virginia’s driver’s license suspension scheme violates
the Fourteenth Amendment because some ability-to-pay determination is demanded
by the Due Process Clause prior to a license suspension. The Note is split into four
parts. Part I will examine the background of Virginia’s driver’s license suspension
scheme, as well as the larger backdrop of the criminalization of poverty more gen-
erally, and posit that the Virginia statutory scheme is a part of that trend.26 Part II will
develop the procedural due process portion of the argument and examine the nor-
mative concerns at the heart of that argument. It will argue that some opportunity to be
heard is necessary prior to suspending a license for unpaid debts.27 Part III will intro-
duce the Fourteenth Amendment’s prohibition on punishing people for their poverty,
which merges equal protection and due process principles.28 It will also posit that
this merging is not a uniform convergence, but rather that the line of cases that give
weight to this principle exists along a spectrum, with equal protection on one end
and due process on the other. Part IV will argue that, in contrast to equal protection
principles, the fundamental fairness principle of the Due Process Clause provides
the best challenge to the Virginia statutory scheme, and argue that it in fact prohibits
the state from automatically suspending licenses of those without the ability to pay.29
I. VIRGINIA’S DRIVER’S LICENSE SUSPENSION SCHEME AND THE
CRIMINALIZATION OF POVERTY
A. Virginia’s Driver’s License Suspension Scheme
In the Commonwealth of Virginia, the fines and fees levied by the courts have
risen substantially in the past few decades.30 Courts can assess fees for a number of op-
erational concerns apart from the defendant’s restitution to the state.31 Some of these
25 Stinnie v. Holcomb, No 3:16-CV-00044, 2017 WL 963234, at *20 (W.D. Va. Mar. 13,
2017), appeal filed, No. 17-1740 (4th Cir. June 16, 2017).
26 See infra Part I.
27 See infra Part II.
28 See infra Part III.
29 See infra Part IV.
30 In 1998, Virginia assessed $281.5 million in fines and fees, compared to $618.8 million
in 2014. COMPENSATION BOARD, FY 2014, FINES & FEES REPORT 2 (2015), https://rga.lis.vir
ginia.gov/published/2016/RD179/pdf [https://perma.cc/6WCJ-Z32B]. This represents over
a 50% increase in assessed fines when accounting for inflation of 45.2% over that period.
U.S. INFLATION CALCULATOR, http://www.usinflationcalculator.com [https://perma.cc/M7
P6-XV58] (last visited Apr. 12, 2018).
31 See VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-275.1 (2018) (designating apportionment of a “fixed felony
fee” of $375 to funds such as “Regional Criminal Justice Academy Training Fund”; “Virginia
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costs bear directly upon a defendant’s ability to seek justice, such as fees assessed
for a trial.32 Failure to pay any portion of these debts to the Commonwealth may result
in the automatic suspension of one’s driver’s license, whether one is licensed by
Virginia or not.33 Additionally, the type of violation that incurs the debt is irrelevant.34
A driver who is cited for driving with an expired vehicle registration is subject to the
same collection and suspension procedures as one who is cited for reckless driving
or driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs (DUI).35
As part of this scheme, the Virginia DMV suspended 366,773 driver’s licenses
due to unpaid court debts in fiscal year 2015 alone.36 One in six drivers had his or
her license suspended for unpaid debts during this fiscal year.37 There is currently
no statutory requirement for Virginia courts to make an inquiry into the ability of
a person to pay these debts before issuing the suspension;38 the failure to pay any
debt owed to the Commonwealth of Virginia automatically triggers a driver’s li-
cense suspension.39 Reinstatement of driving privileges only occurs when the debt
has been paid in full or the defendant has entered into a payment plan with the
Commonwealth.40 The purpose of this scheme is unquestionably incentivizing the
Crime Victim-Witness Fund”; “Courthouse [C]onstruction/[M]aintenance [F]und”; “Sentencing/
[S]upervision [F]ee (General Fund)”; and “Intensified Drug Enforcement Jurisdiction Fund”).
32 In addition to the the standard fees, some fees are determined by the procedure of the
trial. For instance, following judgments in favor of the Commonwealth, the following fees
are assessed: “Any amount paid by the Commonwealth for legal representation of the de-
fendant” and “[a]ny jury costs.” Id. § 17.1-275.5(A)(1), (7).
33 See VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-395(A) (2018) (“Any person, whether licensed by Virginia
or not, who drives a motor vehicle on the highways in the Commonwealth shall thereby, as a
condition of such driving, consent to pay all lawful fines, court costs, forfeitures, restitution,
and penalties assessed against him for violations of the laws of the Commonwealth.”).
34 See id. § 46.2-395(A)–(B).
35 See id. 
36 LEGAL AID JUSTICE CTR., DRIVEN DEEPER INTO DEBT: UNREALISTIC REPAYMENT OP-
TIONS HURT LOW-INCOME COURT DEBTORS 2 (2016), https://www.justice4all.org/wp-con
tent/uploads/2016/05/Driven-Deeper-Into-Debt-Payment-Plan-Analysis-Final.pdf [https://
perma.cc/2LRN-TS2P].
37 Class Action Complaint, supra note 1, at 35–36.
38 See § 46.2-395.
39 See § 46.2-395(B) (“[W]hen any person is convicted of any violation of the law of the
Commonwealth or of the United States or of any valid local ordinance and fails or refuses
to provide for immediate payment in full of any fine, costs, forfeitures, restitution, or penalty
lawfully assessed against him, or fails to make deferred payments or installment payments
as ordered by the court, the court shall forthwith suspend the person’s privilege to drive a motor
vehicle on the highways in the Commonwealth.”).
40 See id. (“The driver’s license of the person shall continue suspended until the fine, costs,
forfeiture, restitution, or penalty has been paid in full. However, if the defendant, after having
his license suspended, pays the reinstatement fee to the Department of Motor Vehicles and
enters into an agreement under § 19.2-354 that is acceptable to the court to make deferred
payments or installment payments of unpaid fines, costs, forfeitures, restitution, or penalties as
ordered by the court, the defendant’s driver’s license shall thereby be restored.”).
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payment of court debts.41 Despite these punitive measures, Virginia only actually
collects about half of the revenue assessed by the citations it imposes.42
The practice of suspending driver’s licenses for unpaid court debts is not unique
to Virginia; many states have similar schemes.43 In recent years, however, some states
have been working towards reforming their systems.44 The State of Washington stopped
its practice of suspending driver’s licenses for failing to pay debts originating from
nonmoving violations, such as expired registrations.45 Other states have practices
that have proven less burdensome to drivers. In California, only seventeen percent
of drivers had their license suspended over an eight-year period for failure to pay
debts or failure to appear in court.46
There have been some attempts at reform of Virginia’s scheme, coming from both
within the legislature and as recommendations from the Department of Justice. The
Department of Justice has stated: “If a defendant’s driver’s license is suspended be-
cause of failure to pay a fine, such a suspension may be unlawful if the defendant
was deprived of his due process right to establish inability to pay.”47 On January 3,
2017, Governor Terry McAuliffe gave a press conference where he called reform of the
current system “common sense” and announced that he will advocate for legislation
changing the practice.48 In January 2017, the Virginia General Assembly introduced
41 The Virginia DMV itself asserted:
The Virginia Supreme Court articulated the purposes of the statutory court
collection process, which are achieved through the license suspension
provision in § 46.2-395. The purposes are: (i) to facilitate the payment of
fines, court costs, penalties, restitution and other financial responsibilities
assessed against defendants convicted of a criminal offense or traffic
infraction, (ii) to collect the monies due to the Commonwealth and lo-
calities as a result of these convictions, and (iii) to assure payment of
court-ordered restitution to victims of crime.
Defendant’s Reply to Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dis-
miss at 7, Stinnie v. Holcomb, 2017 WL 963234 (W.D. Va. Mar. 13, 2017) (No. 3:16-cv-00044-
NKM-JCH), appeal filed, No. 17-1740 (4th Cir. June 16, 2017).
42 Carolyn Kalantari, Opinion, Kalantari: Further Criminalizing Debtors Doesn’t Make
Sense, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH (May 3, 2013), http://www.richmond.com/opinion/their
-opinion/guest-columnists/article_084eb03e-3509-50f6-9bce-801ac91739cf.html [https://per
ma.cc/QY7E-CJPK] (“On average the [C]ommonwealth has assessed $357 million and col-
lected $185 million, leaving an average of $170 million uncollected each year.”).
43 See Shaila Dewan, Driver’s License Suspensions Create Cycle of Debt, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 15, 2015, at A1.
44 See id.
45 Id.
46 Statement of Interest of the United States at 3–4, Stinnie, 2017 WL 963234 (No. 3:16-
CV-00044-NKM-JCH).
47 Letter from Vanita Gupta, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div.,
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, & Lisa Foster, Dir., Office for Access to Justice, U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
at 6 (Mar. 14, 2016) (on file with author) [hereinafter Gupta & Foster Letter].
48 Graham Moomaw, McAuliffe Looks to Roll Back Driver’s License Suspensions As Part
of Criminal Justice Reform Package, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH (Jan. 3, 2017), http://www
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a bill that would have significantly addressed the issues in the current scheme.49 This
bill did not pass, but the legislature did attempt to alleviate some of the issues with
the passage of Virginia Code Section 19.2-354.1, which is a statutory version of
Virginia Supreme Court Rule 1:24.50 The idea behind this statute is that general dis-
trict courts would provide payment plans that would help debtors, thus making it
easier for them to reinstate driver’s licenses.51 This has not worked out as planned, as
troubling rates of license suspension continue apparently unaffected.52 More re-
cently, the Virginia Senate passed a bill that would eliminate the automatic suspen-
sions of driver’s licenses, but a House subcommittee voted to shelve the issue until
next year’s legislative session.53 However, the Commonwealth of Virginia has yet
to pass any significant reforms to its current system, and it has contested the suit
filed by Mr. Stinnie in July 2016.54
B. The Criminalization of Poverty in Virginia’s Driver’s License Suspension Scheme
Virginia’s practice of automatically suspending licenses for unpaid debt could
be classified as part of a troubling trend that is known as the “criminalization of
.richmond.com/news/virginia/article_390e9595-bf77-56d1-ab5e-f51871cd4243.html [https:
//perma.cc/FM5B-KG5X].
49 H.B. 1862, 2017 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2017). This bill would change the lan-
guage of Section 46.2-395 of the Virginia Code to remove the automatic suspension pro-
vision and
[u]pon a finding that the defendant’s default was not due to an intentional
refusal of the defendant to obey the sentence of the court, nor attributable
to a failure on the defendant’s part to make a good faith effort to obtain the
necessary funds for payment, the court shall not suspend the defendant’s
driver’s license but may enter an order (i) providing additional time for
payment, (ii) reducing the amount of each installment, (iii) assigning
the person to perform community service in lieu of payment, or (iv) waiv-
ing the unpaid portion in whole or in part.
Id.
50 See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-354.1 (2018); VA. SUP. CT. R. 1:24.
51 See § 19.2-354.1.
52 See generally LEGAL AID JUSTICE CTR., DRIVING ON EMPTY: PAYMENT PLAN REFORMS
DON’T FIX VIRGINIA’S COURT DEBT CRISIS (2018), https://www.justice4all.org/wp-content
/uploads/2018/01/Driving-on-Empty-Payment-Plan-Analysis-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc
/PR6L-5JUT] [hereinafter DRIVING ON EMPTY].
53 Michael Martz, House Panel Puts Off Bill to Repeal Law on Court Fines, Driver’s Li-
censes, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH (Mar. 2, 2018), http://www.richmond.com/news/virginia
/government-politics/general-assembly/house-panel-puts-off-bill-to-repeal-law-on-court
/article_018d9124-3c02-54e6-b978-8fd748ab784e.html [https://perma.cc/V7UZ-UT9P].
54 See Justin Wm. Moyer, ‘DMV Is Not Responsible’: Va. Denies Claim It Unfairly Sus-
pends Driver’s Licenses, WASH. POST (Oct. 5, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local
/public-safety/dmv-is-not-responsible-va-denies-claim-it-unfairly-suspends-drivers-li
censes/2016/10/04/6bc19eae-8a68-11e6-b24f-a7f89eb68887_story.html?utm_term=.49100
efdb8c7 [https://perma.cc/RR53-H28W].
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poverty.”55 The “criminalization of poverty” is an inflammatory name, but in prac-
tice, it is a concept that functions exactly as described.56 At its core, it is the line that
is crossed when enforcement of ordinances leaves the realm of public safety and
becomes merely a means of revenue generation.57 In the typical context, this is seen
when municipalities exact exorbitant fees for violations that are not especially dan-
gerous or harmful to public safety.58 For example, in Ferguson, Missouri, “this in-
cluded outrageous fines for minor infractions like failing to show proof of insurance
and letting grass and weeds in a yard get too high.”59 To be sure, there is some dif-
ficulty in drawing the line between the uniform enforcement of the law and the ex-
ploitative practices that amount to the criminalization of poverty. However, in some
cases, the practical effects of enforcement make plain the ways in which they cripple
the poor specifically through a focus on revenue generation.60
This focus on revenue generation was at the forefront of the Department of Jus-
tice’s inquiry into the policing practices of the Ferguson, Missouri, police department
in the wake of the death of Michael Brown: “The Department of Justice found each
year Ferguson set targets for the police and the courts to generate more and more
money from municipal fines. And Ferguson isn’t alone. The criminalization of pov-
erty is a growing trend in states and localities across the country.”61 In the Department
of Justice’s Ferguson Report, the investigators noted this phenomenon in several
different ways: the use of arrest warrants as a means of collection, the ways in which
officials spoke of revenue generation, and the procedural hurdles imposed by the courts
in order to generate revenue.62
One can also understand this drive for revenue generation through the raw num-
bers of increased expenditures. In recent years, criminal justice expenditures in the
states have continued to grow.63 Between 1993 and 2012, “total nominal spending
55 See Marian Wright Edelman, Criminalizing Poverty, HUFFPOST (May 8, 2016), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/marion-wright-edelman-criminalizing-poverty_b_7245538.html
[https://perma.cc/8K6R-BRGP].
56 See Gupta & Foster Letter, supra note 47, at 2 (“[T]o the extent that these practices are
geared not toward addressing public safety, but rather toward raising revenue, they can cast
doubt on the impartiality of the tribunal and erode trust between local governments and their
constituents.”).
57 See id.
58 For an example of exorbitant fees, see Edelman, supra note 55.
59 Id.
60 See id.
61 Id.
62 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON PO-
LICE DEPARTMENT 42–62 (2015).
63 See, e.g., Suzy Khimm, Will the Government Stop Using the Poor as a Piggy Bank?,
MSNBC (Sept. 9, 2014, 1:38 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/will-the-government-stop
-using-the-poor-piggy-bank [https://permac.cc/K554-LLTN] (“Court fees and fines have been
on the rise nationwide on the state level and in some municipalities as government officials
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on the criminal justice system grew from $97 billion to $265 billion, a growth rate
of over 170 percent.”64
Courts around the country have begun to internalize this economic pressure. In
some cases, one can find court officials holding the view that funding their opera-
tions is not a necessary condition of administering justice, but instead is part and parcel
of justice itself. For example, one state court administrator in Michigan stated:
The only reason that the court is in operation and doing business
at this point in time is because that defendant has come in and is
a user of those services . . . . [Defendants] don’t necessarily see
themselves as a customer because, obviously, they’re not choos-
ing to be there. But in reality they are.65
In the context of traffic violations and fines, this profit motive is especially grim: some
cities have been caught shortening yellow lights in an effort to generate more camera-
generated traffic tickets,66 which is a practice that has been shown to make intersec-
tions more dangerous.67 Consistent with these trends across the United States, fees
and fines assessed by courts in Virginia have risen at a rate that substantially outpaces
inflation.68 This revenue generation motive affects the poor harshly; the accumula-
tion of debts owed to courts can result in something of a debt collections spiral, leading
to imprisonment in some cases.69 Mr. Stinnie found himself in such a spiral, and he
have cobbled together budgets in an era of budget cuts and growing resistance to tax hikes.”). See
generally WHITE HOUSE COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, FINES,
FEES, AND BAIL: PAYMENTS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM THAT DISPROPORTIONATELY IM-
PACT THE POOR (2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/page/files
/1215_cea_fine_fee_bail_issue_brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/3H8B-3TPS] [hereinafter FINES,
FEES, AND BAIL].
64 FINES, FEES, AND BAIL, supra note 63, at 2 n.4.
65 Joseph Shapiro, As Court Fees Rise, the Poor Are Paying the Price, NPR (May 19, 2014,
4:02 PM), http://www.npr.org/2014/05/19/312158516/increasing-court-fees-punish-the-poor.
66 6 Cities that Were Caught Shortening Yellow Light Times for Profit, NAT’L MOTORISTS
ASS’N BLOG (Mar. 26, 2008), https://www.motorists.org/blog/6-cities-that-were-caught-short
ening-yellow-light-times-for-profit/ [https://perma.cc/F8F4-944B].
67 See generally William A. Stimpson et al., The Influence of the Time Duration of Yellow
Traffic Signals on Driver Response, ITE J. (1980), https://www.motorists.org/wp-content/themes
/nma/pk/lib/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=https://www.motorists.org/wp-content/uploads
/2015/09/yellow-duration.pdf (discussing the safety hazards associated with short yellow lights).
68 Even when accounting for inflation, assessed fines and fees grew by over 50% between
1998 and 2014. See supra note 30.
69 See, e.g., Radley Balko, Opinion, States and Cities Choose Dollars over Safety, WASH.
POST (Jan. 10, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/opinions/wp/2014/01/10/revenue
-generation-over-public-safety/?tid=a_inl&utm_term=.1226414e4002 [https://perma.cc/695T
-FLZA] (“I had many clients tell me, ‘I had to keep working to have a chance to raise the
money I needed to fix this situation, and in order to work, I had to drive.’ Bam. It’s a [driving
with suspended license] charge waiting to happen.”).
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spent a weekend in jail as the result of his second misdemeanor conviction for driv-
ing with a suspended license.70
Like other states, Virginia remits court debts to state and local treasuries.71 The
Code of Virginia lays out this distribution: “[O]ne-half of such fee shall be paid into
the treasury of the county or city in which the offense for which warrant issued was
committed, and the other one-half of such fees shall be paid by such clerk on his
monthly remittance into the state treasury.”72 Thus the economic pressure to balance
state and local budgets is logically transferred from the state to those assessed court
fines and fees. For those well above the poverty line, paying these court costs and
fines is a mere inconvenience; but for the poor, however, they represent a burden on
personal liberty.73 Intuitively, one understands that a debt assessed on people of dif-
fering incomes will have different effects. Studies have borne out this intuition:
drivers with more economic means are less likely to change their behavior in re-
sponse to more economically punitive fines.74 For instance, studies have shown that
increasing fines for red light violations impacts the driving behaviors of the indigent
more than the wealthy.75 When fines are increased for red light violations, the poor
are more likely to change their driving behaviors to avoid such a violation.76
Like the red light violators, it is logical to assume that people who owe debts to the
court will be affected differently depending on their economic circumstances. As
Virginia’s assessed fines and fees have increased above the rate of inflation and without
regard for the economic health of the indigent, it is reasonable to conclude that the
enforcement mechanism of the suspended driver’s license has produced more and more
economic pressure for the indigent who hope to maintain their licenses. This economic
pressure that is transferred to the poor in response to pressures of Virginia to collect its
debts is the core of the “criminalization of poverty.” The creeping nature of this in-
justice has opened the Virginia statutory scheme up to several constitutional challenges.
II. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS: THE MATHEWS STANDARD AND THE
NECESSITY FOR AN OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD
The first such challenge is given by procedural due process. Procedural due pro-
cess is granted by the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee that states shall not “deprive
70 Class Action Complaint, supra note 1, at 11–12.
71 See, e.g., KAREN DOLAN & JODI L. CARR, INST. FOR POLICY STUDIES, THE POOR GET
PRISON: THE ALARMING SPREAD OF THE CRIMINALIZATION OF POVERTY 30 (2015), http://
www.ips-dc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/IPS-The-Poor-Get-Prison-Final.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/3K2Z-H2LF]; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-69.48 (2018).
72 § 16.1-69.48(A).
73 See Barbara Ehrenreich, Foreword to DOLAN & CARR, supra note 71, at 5.
74 See FINES, FEES, AND BAILS, supra note 63, at 4.
75 See id.
76 See id.
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any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”77 Prior to any such
deprivation, the state must provide some process that is specific to the interest at
stake.78 The first question to be answered, however, is: was there deprivation of a
protected life, liberty, or property interest?79 If a life, liberty, or property interest is
in fact implicated, the Court analyzes the procedural protections of the statute under
the standard laid out in Mathews v. Eldridge80 to determine if they are adequate.81
Virginia’s scheme unquestionably implicates a property interest.82 The Court has
repeatedly held that a deprivation of the continued use and possession of a driver’s
license through a suspension of that license implicates due process.83 The Court even
expounded upon the nature of this property interest in Mackey v. Montrym,84 noting
that the interest in the “continued possession and use of [a driver’s] license” is
“substantial.”85 Notably, the Court acknowledged that the removal of this interest
constitutes not only a “personal inconvenience,” but also an “economic hardship.”86
This candid acknowledgment by the Court that the property interest in driver’s li-
censes is economic is supported by findings that show the economic importance of
car access.87 It is also of critical importance to the analysis of procedural protections
due to drivers under the Mathews standard, because the nature of the property in-
terest is one of the three factors of the standard.88
In the case of the Virginia driver’s license scheme, the Mathews standard un-
questionably calls for an opportunity to be heard for several reasons. Under the
Mathews standard for evaluating procedural due process, the court must address three
factors. For the purposes of this Note, these three are split into four: (1) the nature and
importance of the private interest affected; (2) the nature and importance of the gov-
ernment’s interest; (3) the risk that the procedure will result in erroneous depriva-
tions and what value additional or different procedures would provide; and (4) what
77 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
78 See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
79 Erwin Chemerinsky, Procedural Due Process Claims, 16 TOURO L. REV. 871, 871 (2000).
Chemerinsky breaks this part of the analysis into two questions: (1) was there a “deprivation,”
and (2) was the deprivation of a life, liberty or property interest? Id.
80 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
81 See id. at 335.
82 Cf. Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 10 (1979) (holding that there is a property interest
in driver’s licenses).
83 Id. at 10 n.7.
84 443 U.S. 1 (1979).
85 Id. at 11.
86 Id.
87 See Adie Tomer & Joseph Kane, Cars Remain King and Barrier to Economic Oppor-
tunity, BROOKINGS INST. (Oct. 23, 2014), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2014
/10/23/cars-remain-king-and-barrier-to-economic-opportunity/ [https://perma.cc/HK4E-2A
SW] (discussing the central role of cars in job commutes, even in urban environments).
88 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
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additional fiscal or administrative burdens would be imposed by additional or dif-
ferent procedures.89
The current scheme is inadequate under this standard. Prior to November 2016,
only a thirty-day notice to pay was required for persons facing court debts.90 On
November 1, 2016, the Virginia Supreme Court adopted a rule that calls for the thirty-
day notice as well as the ability of persons to request deferred payments, installment
plans, or community service in lieu of payment.91 This rule may in fact address some
of the concerns surrounding the previous scheme, though the evidence shows that
it has not done so to date.92 The rule also does not provide any solutions for Mr. Stinnie,
his fellow class action plaintiffs, or the many others in his situation—they still have not
been granted their proper due process, as their licenses were suspended without such
opportunity.93 For them, an opportunity to be heard is thus required under Mathews
because the property interest in a driver’s license is “substantial” and “economic”;94
the government interest in the collection of the debts is low, especially when com-
pared to other possible reasons to suspend a driver’s license;95 and the risk of erroneous
deprivations is substantial, especially when considering the plight of the indigent
facing such a suspension.96 The Complaint in Mr. Stinnie’s case alleged this viola-
tion of procedural due process, and the Department of Justice submitted a Statement
of Interest which gave color to the precedential basis for this claim.97 The Mathews
analysis in this Note focuses on the normative concerns at the heart of these arguments. 
A. The Nature and Importance of the Driver’s License as a Property Interest
The first factor, the nature and importance of the private interest, is a “substantial”
one, as well as “economic,” as noted above.98 The economic importance of a driver’s
license has remained substantial in the years since the Court recognized it as a prop-
erty interest in Mackey, if not increased, especially for the poor.99 Sociological studies
89 Id.
90 See VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-395(C) (2018).
91 VA. SUP. CT. R. 1:24(b)–(c); see DRIVING ON EMPTY, supra note 52, at 8.
92 See generally DRIVING ON EMPTY, supra note 52.
93 See Class Action Complaint, supra note 1, at 47–49.
94 Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 11 (1979).
95 See Class Action Complaint, supra note 1, at 48–49.
96 See id. at 49.
97 See id. at 47–49; Statement of Interest of the United States, supra note 46, at 6–14.
98 See supra notes 80–86 and accompanying text.
99 See S.F. OFFICE OF ECON. & WORKFORCE DEV., DRIVER’S LICENSE SUSPENSIONS AS
A WORKFORCE BARRIER, http://oewd.org/sites/default/files/FileCenter/Documents/759-4c%
20-%20Driver%27s%20License%20Suspensions.pdf [https://perma.cc/A6PS-E72C] (last visited
Apr. 12, 2018) (“Mothers with young children on welfare and in subsidized child care are twice
as likely to find sustained employment if they had a driver’s license. For this population, having
a driver’s license is more important for finding steady work than a high school diploma.”).
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have shown that access to a car leads to an increased “probability of becoming em-
ployed and leaving [welfare].”100 As Ryan Schwier and Autumn James pointed out,
“[n]umerous studies have shown a positive correlation between car ownership, job
security, and higher earnings.”101 They elaborated: “As one study reported, ‘[c]ars en-
sure that more people can fully contribute to the local economy because vehicle
ownership increases employment opportunities, hours worked, and wages earned.’”102
Thus, it is clear that not only is vehicle access important to the economic interests
of all, it is especially important to the economic interests of the indigent. So, the in-
terest at stake, when considering potential procedural protections due under Mathews,
is both significant and economic.
The property interest in question is also a government-granted one.103 It thus
finds analogy in other government-granted property interests for those experiencing
poverty. When one examines the treatment of the courts of other government-granted
property interests with similar qualities, it becomes clear that increased procedural
protections are due. In Goldberg v. Kelly,104 the Court held that the termination of
public assistance by New York State prior to affording a particular recipient an
evidentiary hearing is a violation of procedural due process.105 This case exemplifies
the idea that government-granted property rights that implicate the economic well-
being of the indigent should be granted protections because of this importance.106 In
Goldberg, the Court stated: “We have come to recognize that forces not within the con-
trol of the poor contribute to their poverty.”107 Continuing, the Court asserted: “Public
assistance, then, is not mere charity, but a means to ‘promote the general Welfare, and
secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity.’”108 This strident
defense of the property interest in Goldberg thus showed the Court’s desire to afford
100 Tami Gurley & Donald Bruce, The Effects of Car Access on Employment Outcomes
for Welfare Recipients, 58 J. URB. ECON. 250, 262 (2005).
101 RYAN T. SCHWIER & AUTUMN JAMES, HEALTH & HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC, IND. UNIV.
ROBERT H. MCKINNEY SCH. OF LAW, ROADBLOCK TO ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE: HOW
DRIVER’S LICENSE SUSPENSION POLICIES IN INDIANA IMPEDE SELF-SUFFICIENCY, BURDEN
STATE GOVERNMENT & TAX PUBLIC RESOURCES 31 (2016), https://mckinneylaw.iu.edu/prac
tice/clinics/_docs/DL_Rpt_2-1-16.pdf [https://perma.cc/CHK8-S2X5].
102 Id. (citing Access to Driving, MOBILITY AGENDA, http://www.mobilityagenda.org/page
/Access-to-Driving.aspx [https://perma.cc/AWE4-74UX] (last visited Apr. 12, 2018)).
103 Driver’s Licenses in Virginia are issued after submitting an application to the Virginia
Department of Motor Vehicles. See Applying for a Driver’s License, VA. DEP’T OF MOTOR
VEHICLES, https://www.dmv.virginia.gov/drivers/#applying.asp [https://perma.cc/V6QC-6J
KQ] (last visited Apr. 12, 2018).
104 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
105 Id. at 264–66.
106 See id. at 264–65 (discussing the prudence in protecting the process rights of indigent
defendants).
107 Id. at 265.
108 Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. pmbl.).
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procedural protections that reflected the gravity of property interest that it found in
welfare benefits.
This principle of providing protections to the government-granted property
interests of the indigent is far-reaching. Another example is found in the administra-
tion of the federal government’s housing assistance programs. Housing vouchers are
provided to those who are unable to secure assistance themselves.109 These vouchers
are granted on the basis of the inability of the applicants to secure housing due to
their economic circumstances.110 Once granted, courts have held that such a voucher
constitutes a property interest that cannot be revoked without procedural due process
protections.111 Persons facing revocation of their voucher for any reason are granted
the right to an administrative hearing to hear the evidence against them and to pre-
sent their own.112 The federal housing voucher program is thus an example of the
federal government adhering to principles that were laid out in Goldberg.113
A driver’s license is not usually considered a welfare benefit per se. However,
in its practical applications, it functions similarly to one.114 It is an economic prop-
erty interest, granted by the state, that has increased significance to those experiencing
poverty.115 The principle that led the Court to find a substantial interest in welfare
benefits should thus be extended to driver’s licenses. Therefore, the economic impor-
tance in driver’s licenses, as well as the Court’s eagerness to protect the government-
granted property interests of the indigent, should lead the Court to find that the
private interest in driver’s licenses is very substantial.
B. The Nature and Importance of the Government’s Interest in Collections
The next factor that requires analysis under the Mathews standard is the state’s
interest in the scheme.116 The Commonwealth of Virginia’s interest in this scheme
109 Housing Choice Vouchers Fact Sheet, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING & URB. DEV., http://
portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/topics/housing_choice_voucher_program_section_8
[https://perma.cc/9DD4-U5UD] (last visited Apr. 12, 2018).
110 Id. (“Eligibility for a housing voucher is determined by the [public housing agencies]
based on the total annual gross income and family size . . . .”).
111 See, e.g., Nozzi v. Hous. Auth. of L.A., 806 F.3d 1178, 1191 (9th Cir. 2015).
112 U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING & URBAN DEV., HOUSING CHOICE VOUCHER PROGRAM
GUIDEBOOK—CHAPTER 16: INFORMAL REVIEWS AND HEARINGS § 16.2, https://portal.hud.gov
/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=DOC_11760.pdf [https://perma.cc/R4A7-DTUB] (last visited
Apr. 12, 2018).
113 See 397 U.S. at 264–65.
114 One interesting debate that frames driver’s licenses similarly to welfare benefits is seen in
the immigration context. See LYNN A. KAROLY & FRANCISCO PEREZ-ARCE, RAND CORP., A
COST-BENEFIT FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING THE ECONOMIC AND FISCAL IMPACTS OF STATE-
LEVEL IMMIGRATION POLICIES 59 (2016), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research
_reports/RR1300/RR1397/RAND_RR1397.pdf [https://perma.cc/2KCT-P9HW].
115 See supra notes 77–108 and accompanying text.
116 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
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is in the collection of court debts.117 The simplest way to analyze the importance of
this interest is through comparison to other potential interests that compel the state
to suspend driver’s licenses.
In Mackey, the Court addressed the question of procedural due process in the con-
text of driver’s license suspensions for drivers who refuse breathalyser tests during
police traffic stops.118 Massachusetts had a policy of requiring an automatic suspen-
sion of driver’s licenses for persons who refuse to take a breathalyser test.119 The sus-
pension was immediate and lasted for ninety days.120 There was also the option for
the driver to seek a post-suspension hearing.121
In Mackey, it was clear that the government’s interest was an important one:
highway safety.122 Drunk drivers pose an acute threat to themselves and others on the
road.123 People who refuse breathalyser tests are probably those who have been drink-
ing. The automatic suspension of driver’s licenses prevents such persons from driving
while the state contemplates prosecution.124 It also incentivizes people to not frivo-
lously refuse such tests, thus further ratifying the suspicion placed upon those who do
refuse.125 The government certainly has a compelling safety interest in this scheme.126
In comparison, the interest that the Commonwealth of Virginia has in the col-
lection of its debts is much less compelling. It is clear that the government’s objec-
tive is in the collection of all assessed fines and court costs.127 The Virginia DMV
has admitted as much on the record, and there is no evidence to show that the dep-
rivation of the license is being done for any other reason, such as highway safety as
in Mackey.128 This obvious effort to use the threatened suspension of a driver’s li-
cense amounts to a coercive incentive for defendants to pay their assessed fines, lest
117 See Defendant’s Reply to Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant’s Mo-
tion to Dismiss, supra note 41, at 7.
118 443 U.S. 1, 3–4 (1979).
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 7.
122 Id. at 19.
123 In Virginia, for example, 2,613 people were killed by drunk drivers between 2003 and
2012. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, SOBERING FACTS: DRUNK DRIVING IN
VIRGINIA (2014), http://www.cdc.gov/motorvehiclesafety/pdf/impaired_driving/drunk_driv
ing_in_va_custom.pdf [https://perma.cc/VX4C-9USB]. “Every day, 28 people in the United
States die in motor vehicle crashes that involve an alcohol-impaired driver. This is one death
every 51 minutes. The annual cost of alcohol-related crashes totals more than $44 billion.”
Impaired Driving, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/motorve
hiclesafety/impaired_driving/ [https://perma.cc/M9RD-U3BC] (last updated June 15, 2017).
124 See, e.g., Mackey, 443 U.S. at 19.
125 See id. at 18.
126 See id. at 19.
127 See Defendant’s Reply to Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant’s Mo-
tion to Dismiss, supra note 41, at 7.
128 Compare id., with Mackey, 443 U.S. at 11.
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they lose the substantial property interest in their driver’s licenses, potentially lead-
ing them further into “economic hardship.”129
To be sure, the state does have an interest in the collection of debts owed to it.130
However, it is important to note the efficacy of the scheme. As noted above, a huge
amount of court costs and fees go unpaid each year—despite the large number of
driver’s license suspensions issued.131 The failure of this system is pretty simple to un-
derstand from an economic perspective. Take Mr. Stinnie for example. By the time
he had received over $1,000 in court costs and his driver’s license suspended, he was
already in dire financial straights.132 So dire, in fact, that he was having difficulty
making his monthly car payments, despite pooling resources with his brother.133 His
housing situation was unstable as well, only finding a subsidized housing arrange-
ment after three months of searching, and even then only given guaranteed placement
for a year.134 In such a situation, the economic incentives are simply not there for
Mr. Stinnie to prioritize his court debts. If he does not have a car, then there is no use
in having a valid driver’s license; and if he does not have housing, then all other pri-
orities are moot, and his car becomes of the utmost importance. So it is not only un-
derstandable that he does not prioritize his court debts, it is also completely rational.
In fact, not only does the scheme fail to provide proper economic incentives for
the collection of debts, it may also make the road less safe. As noted above, Mr. Stinnie
has a substantial material interest in keeping possession of his car, because there is
a significant chance that he may end up without shelter. Additionally, despite his
license suspension, he may have to use his vehicle for basic necessities and emer-
gencies, which are likely to occur given his precarious housing situation. In the event
that he does drive his vehicle with a suspended license, he will be putting other
drivers at risk.135 Therefore, while Virginia’s interest in recovering court costs is com-
pelling, it does not rise to level of highway safety, and the suspension of a driver’s
license is, at best, ineffectual for those in deep poverty, and may even harm others
on the road.
C. The Risk of Erroneous Deprivations
As discussed, there is an important property interest in driver’s licenses, and the
government does have some lesser interest in its collections through the suspension
129 See supra notes 84–88 and accompanying text.
130 See, e.g., Class Action Complaint, supra note 1, at 49.
131 See supra notes 36–42 and accompanying text.
132 See Class Action Complaint, supra note 1, at 7–9.
133 Id. at 10–13.
134 Id. at 10.
135 See, e.g., LINDSAY I. GRIFFIN, III & SANDRA DELAZERDA, AAA FOUND. FOR TRAFFIC
SAFETY, UNLICENSED TO KILL 10 (2000), http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi
=10.1.1.610.9773&rep=rep1&type=pdf [https://perma.cc/EN3P-84VX].
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scheme. The next step of the Mathews analysis of procedural protections requires the
Court to look at the risk that the procedure will result in an erroneous deprivation.136
The frame of analysis that one takes here is largely determined by the normative
view that one takes toward those in poverty. In other words, if one believes that all
people who refuse to pay their fines are doing so willingly, then no such “erroneous
deprivation[s]” take place under the scheme.137 Alternatively, if some people do not
pay their fines through no fault of their own, but rather because of their inability to
pay, then the suspension of their driver’s licenses is in fact erroneous.
Under the first view, refusal to pay becomes prima facie evidence of unwilling-
ness to pay, allowing for a license suspension. Therefore, no one is erroneously de-
prived of this driver’s license under this view. The government’s interest in collections
is properly served by the suspension of a driver’s license, and thus the statute would
be more likely to hold up to procedural due process challenges. The alternative view
is that some people who refuse to pay the court fees and fines assessed against them
are simply unable to pay them. Under this view, Virginia is depriving some persons
of a property interest because of their inability to pay rather than their willful
refusal. The scheme is thus inadequate under the Mathews standard. The procedural
protections must be such that the risk of “erroneous deprivation[s]” is low.138 Since
about half of fees assessed by Virginia go uncollected,139 it becomes clear that some
people, such as Mr. Stinnie, are being erroneously deprived of this property interest.
Thus the argument is reduced to whether or not people who refuse to pay are
doing so willingly. When one considers the economics of poverty, the answer be-
comes more clear, and Mr. Stinnie’s story helps provide an answer to this question.
To be sure, Mr. Stinnie could potentially pool his resources and save for many
months, or even years, to pay off his court debts, but prioritizing these debts would
be costly, and even unwise. As noted above, Mr. Stinnie does not have a stable hous-
ing situation.140 Housing is the first priority of all consumers, and sits atop the “hier-
archy of needs.”141 Mr. Stinnie’s precarious living arrangement makes his payments
on his used car even more essential. Prioritizing his court debts, and thus further
jeopardizing his ability to find shelter, would be irresponsible in his situation.
Additionally, the ineffectual nature of the collections effort has implications to
the view one takes.142 The large number of people who have not repaid their debts
136 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
137 Id.
138 See id.
139 See Kalantari, supra note 42.
140 See Class Action Complaint, supra note 1, at 10.
141 See Shadiya Mohamed Saleh Baqutayan et al., Describing the Need for Affordable
Livable Sustainable Housing Based on Maslow’s Theory of Need, 6 MEDITERRANEAN J. SOC.
SCI. 353, 353 (2015) (“Housing is a basic human need that Maslow explained in the hier-
archy of needs as a first important level of need similar to food and drink; therefore, it is at
the centre of wellbeing.” (internal citation omitted)).
142 See supra notes 36–42 and accompanying text.
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to the Commonwealth of Virginia could in fact all be refusing to pay as opposed to
unable. This is unlikely, however. Mr. Stinnie’s example gives context to the easy
ways in which court debts can become insurmountable when one is facing the pos-
sible deprivation of more critical needs. Therefore, it is reasonable to view the depri-
vation of a driver’s license of someone who lacks the ability to pay as erroneous,
and thus the scheme has a high level of erroneous deprivation.
D. The Burden of Additional Administrative Procedures
The last factor that needs to be analyzed under the Mathews standard is the bur-
den of additional administrative procedures.143 At first glance this appears challenging
given the large number of people who have had their licenses suspended for unpaid
debts.144 In other contexts, this challenge was made clear following the imposition
of new procedural requirements by the Supreme Court. In Bearden v. Georgia,145 the
Court held that there must be a determination of ability to pay prior to revoking
probation for failure to pay in sentencing hearings.146 One understands intuitively
that this is a very difficult determination to make. One investigation surveyed var-
ious court systems and their judges and found wide-ranging approaches.147 One judge
said that he “ma[d]e judgments based on how people present[ed] themselves in
court.”148 “‘They come in wearing expensive jackets,’ he sa[id] referring to defen-
dants who wear NFL football team jackets, ‘or maybe a thousand dollars’ worth or
tattoos on their arms. And they say, “‘I’m just living on handouts.”’”149
This difficulty is easily avoided, however, in the context of driver’s license sus-
pension. A simple formula that accounts for the person’s income, savings, and is
calculated according to the cost of living in the District Court’s jurisdiction would
allow people such as Mr. Stinnie to provide a showing of inability to pay without
even having to stand before a judge. One objection to this approach is that it amounts
to trying to prove a negative: a court must make a determination that the person
cannot pay by demanding to see as much evidence as possible that he or she can in
fact pay. This is a fair objection, but income and savings can provide fairly reliable
measures of a person’s ability to pay. Additionally, the option of community service,
in lieu of payment, as was enacted by the Virginia Supreme Court in November 2016,
143 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
144 See Class Action Complaint, supra note 1, at 4.
145 461 U.S. 660, 672 (1983).
146 Id.
147 See Joseph Shapiro, Supreme Court Ruling Not Enough to Prevent Debtors Prisons,
NPR (May 21, 2014, 5:01 AM), http://www.npr.org/2014/05/21/313118629/supreme-court
-ruling-not-enough-to-prevent-debtors-prisons.
148 Id.
149 Id.
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is also a good one.150 Such an option would provide an incentive for persons who do
have the means to pay to seek out this alternative method of repayment. This cal-
culation could all be done by court clerks, thus not hindering the busy schedules of
judges. The last concern over this system is the exceptions that could fall through the
cracks. For instance, someone could have a medical emergency that becomes a finan-
cial emergency, and therefore lack the ability to pay his or her court debts despite
a high income. In that case, an initial finding of ability to pay by the formula should
allow for the possibility of appeal and an opportunity to be heard in an administra-
tive hearing. As such events are exceptions, this should result in minimal additional
burden to the justice system. Therefore, the burden of different administrative pro-
cedures is low.
E. Virginia’s Statute Violates Procedural Due Process
Thus, Virginia driver’s license suspension scheme does, in fact, violate proce-
dural due process under the Mathews standard. The risk of erroneous deprivation is
not low, and some ability to pay determination should be made prior to suspending
a driver’s license. The burden that is imposed upon the poor in the assessment of
these debts is substantial, and the courts should recognize this fact by allowing for
an opportunity to be heard prior to the suspension of a driver’s license.
The Virginia scheme’s violation of procedural due process under the Mathews
standard does not render unconstitutional the deprivation of a driver’s license of
someone without the means to pay, however. After hearing Mr. Stinnie’s story, a
court could still determine that he must pay or have his license suspended. Thus,
some other constitutional argument must be made showing that the suspension of
a driver’s license of a person who lacks the ability to pay is unconstitutional in order
to make the procedural due process requirement for an opportunity to be heard into
a necessity of a determination of ability to pay.
III. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT’S PROHIBITION OF
PUNISHMENT DUE TO POVERTY
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause and Due Process Clause
both address issues of poverty, but in different ways. The Equal Protection Clause
enshrines the right to “equal protection of the laws,”151 and in order to do so, it is
wielded by the courts to carefully examine any statute that classifies people, or even
has an effect on people that is disproportional.152 Traditionally, poverty has not been
150 See VA. SUP. CT. R. 1:24(d); see also DRIVING ON EMPTY, supra note 52, at 8.
151 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
152 See Mitchell F. Rice, The Discriminatory Purpose Standard: A Problem for Minorities
in Racial Discrimination Litigation?, 6 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 1, 1–3 (1986) (discussing
the disproportionate impact standard in Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence).
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granted any special status under the Equal Protection Clause.153 San Antonio Inde-
pendent School District v. Rodriquez154 is often cited for the proposition that the
Court has never granted a suspect or quasi-suspect classification to the poor.155 The
Court has repeated that assertion as well: “[T]his Court has held repeatedly that pov-
erty, standing alone, is not a suspect classification.”156 However, the actual treatment
of poverty under the Equal Protection Clause has not been as clean cut as the Court
indicated in Rodriguez.
For instance, the Court has held that, in the criminal context, a poor person may
not be punished for being poor.157 In Bearden, the Court held that the State may not
punish someone for failure to pay his or her fines.158 In that case, the Court determined
that sentencing courts must inquire into the ability of defendants to pay their fines
prior to revoking their probation and imprisoning them.159 It is clear that the Court
was mostly concerned about imprisoning people because of their inability to pay,
and therefore found that such a practice violated the Fourteenth Amendment because
of it.160 Therefore, while poverty is not a “suspect class” for equal protection pur-
poses, people cannot be punished due to their poverty under the Equal Protection
Clause, as exemplified by Bearden. In this way, equal protection prevents different
treatment by the justice system resulting from poverty.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides a means to
tackle issues of poverty in the criminal justice system as well, although more in-
directly. The “fundamental fairness” principle of due process is vague, but essentially
requires that the procedural administration of justice be just.161 One articulation is
given in Rochin v. California.162 The question that needs to be addressed in a fun-
damental fairness inquiry is whether the state’s conduct “offends a ‘sense of justice’
or runs counter to the ‘decencies of civilized conduct.’”163 In order to make this judg-
ment, the court should look to “considerations deeply rooted in reason and in the
153 See Henry Rose, The Poor As a Suspect Class Under the Equal Protection Clause: An
Open Constitutional Question, 34 NOVA L. REV. 407, 408 (2010) (“[T]he poor are neither a
quasi-suspect nor a suspect class under the Equal Protection Clause . . . .”).
154 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
155 See, e.g., Rose, supra note 153, at 408 n.1.
156 Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 323 (1980) (citing James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137
(1971)).
157 See generally Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983) (holding that the State may not
imprison an individual who has made bona fide efforts to pay fines but, because of his pov-
erty, cannot pay the fine).
158 See id. at 671–73.
159 See id. at 672.
160 See id. at 672–73.
161 See Paul T. Wangerin, “Plain Error” and “Fundamental Fairness”: Toward a Defini-
tion of Exceptions to the Rules of Procedural Default, 29 DEPAUL L. REV. 753, 765–67 (1980)
(discussing the difficulty in defining “fundamental fairness” in express terms).
162 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
163 Id. at 175 (Black, J., concurring).
1232 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 26:1213
compelling traditions of the legal profession”164 and “the community’s sense of fair
play and decency.”165 On issues of poverty in the justice system, such arguments can
certainly be raised, and they were in Bearden.166
In the class action suit involving Mr. Stinnie, filed by the Legal Aid Justice
Center, both of these different arguments were outlined.167 This Note advocates for
the due process approach for several reasons. Before addressing the merits of these
arguments, however, it is worth noting that they are actually intimately tied together.
Mr. Stinnie and his fellow plaintiffs separated these arguments in their complaint,
but the Department of Justice, in its Statement of Interest submitted in Mr. Stinnie’s
case, converged them,168 stating that “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment prohibits ‘punish-
ing a person for his poverty.’”169 Bearden actually exemplifies the convergence of
these arguments in the Court’s jurisprudence.170 Justice O’Connor laid the foundation
of her opinion in Bearden by stating: “This Court has long been sensitive to the treat-
ment of indigents in our criminal justice system. Over a quarter century ago, Justice
Black declared that ‘[t]here can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets
depends on the amount of money he has.’”171 After laying out several cases that
granted such holdings, she continued: “Due process and equal protection principles
converge in the Court’s analysis in these cases.”172
This Note contends that this is not a strict convergence of equal protection and due
process principles in these cases, as the Department of Justice implies. Rather, there is
a spectrum, and Mr. Stinnie’s suit exists closer to the due process end of that spectrum
and should be argued as such. First, this Note will lay out the spectrum, then address
the inadequacies of the equal protection arguments to Mr. Stinnie’s case, and finally
move to the positive argument that Virginia’s driver’s license suspension scheme is in
fact a violation of the “fundamental fairness” principle of the Due Process Clause.
A. The Spectrum of Due Process and Equal Protection Principles on Issues of
Poverty
In Mr. Stinnie’s lawsuit against the Virginia DMV, the Department of Justice sub-
mitted a brief arguing that the Virginia statutory scheme does violate the Fourteenth
164 Id. at 171 (majority opinion).
165 Id. at 173.
166 See Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 672–73 (1983) (discussing potential alternative
forms of punishment that consider a defendant’s financial resources).
167 See Class Action Complaint, supra note 1, at 46, 49.
168 See Statement of Interest of the United States, supra note 46, at 14–16.
169 Id. at 14 (quoting Bearden, 461 U.S. at 671).
170 See 461 U.S. at 661–62 (discussing the Fourteenth Amendment as a single entity, with-
out differentiating between due process and equal protection).
171 Id. at 664 (alteration in original) (quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956) (plu-
rality opinion)).
172 Id. at 665 (citing Griffin, 351 U.S. at 17).
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Amendment’s prohibition on punishing people for their poverty, under the line of
cases that includes Bearden, but begins with Griffin v. Illinois.173 The Department
of Justice did not distinguish between the equal protection and due process principles
at work.174 This line of cases does not represent a uniform convergence, however.
In Bearden, the Court acknowledged the distinction between the equal protection
and due process arguments:
[W]e generally analyze the fairness of relations between the crim-
inal defendant and the State under the Due Process Clause, while
we approach the question whether the State has invidiously
denied one class of defendants a substantial benefit available to
another class of defendants under the Equal Protection Clause.175
It is a subtle distinction, but an important one. Intuitively, one understands that there
will be some overlap between these principles. A due process inquiry examines the
entire process, while an equal protection inquiry is limited to the determination that
all classes of defendants are treated equally.176
When one examines further, it becomes clear that one principle usually super-
sedes another. For example, Williams v. Illinois177 is a case that exemplifies the prin-
ciple that the Constitution prohibits punishment due to poverty.178 The Court held
in Williams that “the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires
that the statutory ceiling placed on imprisonment for any substantive offense be the
same for all defendants irrespective of their economic status.”179 The Court did not
address any due process arguments in its majority opinion.180 This was because the
issue was solely one of determining whether or not all defendants were being treated
equally by the justice system.181 Therefore, while due process and equal principles
173 See Statement of Interest of the United States, supra note 46, at 14–15 (“In a long line
of cases beginning with Griffin v. Illinois, the Supreme Court has made clear that con-
ditioning access or outcomes in the justice system solely on a person’s ability to pay violates
the Fourteenth Amendment.” (internal citation omitted)).
174 See id. (referencing only the “Fourteenth Amendment,” but not any of its clauses).
175 461 U.S. 660, 665 (1983). 
176 See id. (stating that the Court focuses on “fairness of relations between the criminal
defendant and the State under the Due Process Clause,” and in contrast, under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause, the Court focuses on “whether the State has invidiously denied one class of
defendants a substantial benefit available to another class of defendants”).
177 399 U.S. 235 (1970).
178 See id. at 240–41 (“We conclude that when the aggregate imprisonment exceeds the
maximum period fixed by statute and results directly from an involuntary nonpayment of a
fine or court costs we are confronted with an impermissible discrimination that rests on abil-
ity to pay . . . .”).
179 Id. at 244.
180 See id. at 235–45.
181 See id. at 236.
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do merge in the cases prohibiting punishment for poverty, one principle often super-
sedes the other.182 In a case of the exception proving the rule, Justice Harlan offered
the lone dissenting opinion in Williams, and argued that the Court was hiding the
ball by choosing the equal protection framing rather than the due process one.183 As
we will see, the question in Mr. Stinnie’s suit is best framed as a due process issue.
The issue with the Virginia license suspension scheme is whether or not the entire
system of collection of court debts through the suspension of driver’s licenses, with-
out inquiries into the ability to pay them, is intrinsically just, rather than whether
each person who faces a license suspension is being treated equally.
B. The Inadequacy of Equal Protection Principles in Mr. Stinnie’s Suit and the
Preferable Nature of Fundamental Fairness Arguments
There are two reasons to prefer the due process framing to the equal protection
one in Mr. Stinnie’s case. First, a due process inquiry would be able to encapsulate
not only the direct effects of the scheme on Mr. Stinnie and other indigent license
holders, but also the overall mechanics by which the Commonwealth uses the scheme
to provide funding for itself. The idea that the Commonwealth uses fines and fees to
fund itself through these collections is part of the argument against it, and such an argu-
ment would not be applicable to an equal protection inquiry. This is because the equal
protection framing restricts the argument to whether all defendants are being equally
treated. Therefore, it does not concern itself with the system of debt collections as a
whole, and arguments in reference to that system are not relevant to equal protection.
Second, it is more difficult to make an equal protection argument due to Mr.
Stinnie’s economic situation. Bearden exhibits well an exact convergence of the equal
protection and due process principles, and would likely sit near the middle of the
spectrum.184 Even so, one can see that the equal protection arguments are stronger in
Bearden than in Mr. Stinnie’s case. In Bearden, the economic incentives to repay debts
were extremely high for the petitioner, who faced the possibility of imprisonment.185
One presumes that such a defendant would liquidate all assets in order to pay off a
debt that must be paid in order to avoid incarceration. This further bolsters the argu-
ment in Bearden that the failure to repay the debt was due to poverty, and therefore
that punishment was inflicted due to poverty.186 Such an argument goes to the heart
182 See supra notes 177–81 and accompanying text (describing the Court’s focus in Williams
v. Illinois on the equal protection analysis); discussion infra Section III.B (describing a due
process framing of Stinnie v. Holcomb).
183 Williams, 399 U.S. at 259 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
184 See 461 U.S. 660, 666–67 (1983).
185 See id. at 662–63 (noting that the petitioner borrowed money in an attempt to pay his
fines).
186 See id. at 671 (stating that the State punishes a probationer for his poverty if they clas-
sify a probationer with poor people).
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of an equal protection analysis: whether the petitioner is being treated differently
because of poverty.
In contrast, it is more difficult to make this determination in Mr. Stinnie’s sit-
uation. Mr. Stinnie does assert, as did the petitioner in Bearden, that he has no money
to pay off his debt.187 A court approaching the arguments in the two cases will much
more readily believe that the petitioner in Bearden is being treated differently solely
due to his poverty, however. Mr. Stinnie faces the threat of revocation of a driving li-
cense, while the petitioner in Bearden faced a threat to his personal liberty.188 Clearly,
the economic incentives for repayment of a debt are stronger in Bearden. Therefore,
the difficulty in establishing conclusively that Mr. Stinnie’s failure to pay was due
to his inability to pay and the preferable nature of the due process arguments all mil-
itate towards a fundamental fairness focus in Mr. Stinnie’s case.
IV. THE VIRGINIA DRIVER’S LICENSE SUSPENSION SCHEME VIOLATES THE
DUE PROCESS PRINCIPLE OF FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides a solid avenue
to attack the Virginia driver’s license suspension scheme, as it has been understood
to protect our “sense of justice.”189 The development of substantive due process doc-
trine more generally provides justification for a more forward-looking understanding
of fundamental fairness as well. The doctrine of fundamental fairness in this context
is intimately linked to traditional substantive due process jurisprudence,190 and has
been considered a substantive due process doctrine in some contexts.191 For this reason,
it is worthwhile to consider the development of substantive due process doctrine.
Traditionally, both the fundamental fairness and substantive due process doctrines
are backward-looking. That is to say, fundamental fairness defines the rights of parties
in the justice system as those that are “deeply rooted”192 in “compelling traditions.”193
Similarly, the traditional understanding of substantive due process has been backward-
looking.194 Substantive due process doctrine has sought to uphold fundamental and
187 See Class Action Complaint, supra note 1, at 12–13.
188 Id. at 8; see Bearden, 461 U.S. at 662–63 (discussing the legal consequences for the
defendant for failing to pay his court fees and court-ordered restitution payments).
189 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952) (citation omitted).
190 See Edward G. Mascolo, Due Process, Fundamental Fairness, and Conduct that Shocks
the Conscience: The Right Not to Be Enticed or Induced to Crime by Government and Its Agents,
7 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 1, 11–12 (1984) (discussing the centrality of fundamental fairness
and due process in the criminal justice system).
191 See 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES 608 (Paul Finkelman ed., 2006)
(discussing how the fundamental fairness doctrine is used to create new constitutional rights).
192 Rochin, 342 U.S. at 171.
193 Id.
194 See generally Kenji Yoshino, A New Birth of Freedom?: Obergefell v. Hodges, 129 HARV.
L. REV. 147 (2015) (discussing textualist interpretations of due process at the Roberts Court).
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otherwise unenumerated rights, that are “deeply rooted in our [Nation’s] history and
traditions.”195 Recently, however, the doctrine of substantive due process has gone
through some changes and become more forward-looking.196 Professor Daniel Conkle
has termed this move as one towards an “evolving national values” approach as
opposed to the “historical traditions” and “reasoned judgment” arguments.197 The sub-
stantive due process doctrine received another upheaval in Obergefell v. Hodges.198
Professor Kenji Yoshino has argued that Obergefell represents “a game changer for
substantive due process jurisprudence” by prioritizing liberty.199 He believes the
Court has created what he calls an “antisubordination liberty” principle, which means
that the liberties protected by substantive due process are those of historically sub-
ordinated citizens.200 The Obergefell decision thus bolsters the idea that the Court
has moved increasingly towards an “evolving national values” approach in substan-
tive due process doctrine.
This turn of substantive due process gives weight to the idea that fundamental
fairness should similarly be understood to address the forward-looking concerns of
subordinated classes. While a substantive due process challenge is not being made
to the Virginia driver’s license scheme, the doctrine of fundamental fairness is a sim-
ilar standard that could certainly be deployed to address government conduct that
offends our sense of justice in its treatment of historically subordinated classes. In the
case of the Virginia driver’s license suspension scheme, a challenge is being made
to the subordination of the poor facing a license suspension.201 The modern develop-
ment of substantive due process doctrine thus provides justification for a turn of fun-
damental fairness doctrine toward more similarly forward-looking protections.
The Virginia driver’s license suspension scheme is a violation of fundamental
fairness. This is because it does in fact offend our sense of justice for two reasons:
(1) the deprivation of a license of a person who lacks the ability to pay is unjust; and
(2) the larger context of placing economic pressure on violators to collect debts con-
tributes to this sense of injustice. The first argument, that the deprivation of license
of a person without the ability to pay is fundamentally unfair, is essentially the same
as the argument that it is an erroneous deprivation, which was the argument pre-
sented in Section II.C.202 Mr. Stinnie’s example once again elucidates this point. His
inability to pay is not the result of a willful refusal, but rather the result of a lack of
financial resources, and this becomes clear when one examines the hierarchy of
195 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 727 (1997).
196 See generally, e.g., Daniel O. Conkle, Three Theories of Substantive Due Process, 85 N.C.
L. REV. 63 (2006) (discussing the recent evolution of the due process doctrine).
197 See generally id.
198 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602–03 (2015).
199 Yoshino, supra note 194, at 148.
200 Id. at 174.
201 See Class Action Complaint, supra note 1, at 1–2.
202 See discussion supra Section II.C.
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human needs and his economic situation.203 This should twinge the conscience, if
not shock it.
The second point—the larger context of placing economic pressure on Mr. Stinnie
in a scheme that is merely designed for debt collections—is a critical one. Virginia
driver’s license suspension scheme does not present any of the explicit evidence of
disdain from law enforcement as did the police department in Ferguson, Missouri,
but it does function in a way that bears at least a resemblance to the “criminalization
of poverty,” as was argued in Part I. This should in fact offend our sense of justice.
Certainly, the question over what in fact violates fundamental fairness is a question
that is ultimately only determined by the judge hearing the case. However, the fact that
there has been a large outcry over the scheme in the wake of public awareness raised
by Mr. Stinnie’s lawsuit shows that it does at a minimum violate the consciences of
many private citizens.204 As was noted in the Rochin case, the standard for justice in a
fundamental fairness inquiry is given by the community as a whole, though the judge
is issuing the decision.205 For these reasons, the due process principle of fundamental
fairness provides a strong argument that it is in fact unconstitutional to deprive
persons of their license who lack the ability to pay. In conjunction with the argument
presented in Part II, this leads to the conclusion that the courts must allow for an
ability to pay determination prior to the suspension of a license.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Stinnie’s case against the Virginia driver’s license suspension scheme is
fairly strong. The scheme is crippling to Virginia residents. It suspends licenses at enor-
mously high rates, with one in six drivers having his or her license suspended at some
point in fiscal year 2015.206 It also is not very effective, in that half of court debts in
Virginia are never collected.207 It is best understood as part of an unsettling trend
towards the criminalization of poverty.208
The Constitution provides several avenues to challenge the scheme. The first is
through procedural due process. The baseline processes by which driver’s licenses
are suspended in Virginia for unpaid court debts was wholly inadequate: the only pro-
cess was a thirty-day notice to pay prior to the automatic suspension.209 In fact, the
203 See discussion supra Section I.C.
204 See, e.g., Dahlia Lithwick, Punished for Being Poor, SLATE (July 16, 2016, 6:19 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2016/07/the_virginia
_driver_s_license_scheme_that_punishes_poor_people.html [https://perma.cc/W83Q-MW
9A] (discussing Mr. Stinnie’s case).
205 See 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952).
206 See Class Action Complaint, supra note 1, at 36.
207 See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
208 See supra Part I.
209 See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
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Mathews standard calls for much more than that: an opportunity to present evidence
that a person is simply unable to pay the court debts.210
The Mathews standard for evaluating procedural due process requires the bal-
ancing of three different factors. These three were split into four for the purposes of
this Note’s analysis. The first factor, the nature and importance of the private inter-
est at stake, is certainly “substantial” and “economic” in the case of a driver’s license.211
Studies confirm the importance of a driver’s license to a person’s economic well-
being.212 Additionally, driver’s licenses function very similarly to welfare benefits,
which are property interests to which the Court has been willing to grant procedural
protections partially because of their importance to the indigent.213 The second fac-
tor, the nature of the governments interest, is relatively low. The suspension of li-
censes under the scheme is being effectuated merely for the purpose of collections
and revenue generation, which is a much less critical priority than others such as
highway safety.214
The third factor, the risk of erroneous deprivations, is the most crucial one, and
largely depends on the view that one takes towards the suspension of Mr. Stinnie’s
license.215 If one believes that this deprivation is not erroneous, but rather that Mr.
Stinnie, and others in his economic situation, are rightfully deprived of their licenses
for refusing payment, then it is unlikely that one will find that the procedures are
inadequate. However, if one believes that the suspension of license of a person who
simply lacks the ability to pay is erroneous, then the procedural scheme is certainly
unjust, and Mr. Stinnie deserves the opportunity to be heard and present his reasons
for non-payment. This second view is persuasive when one examines the economic
incentives of Mr. Stinnie. His housing and healthcare needs clearly provide stronger
incentives for repayment than the court debt, and thus his inability to pay the debt
should not be equated with a willful refusal to pay. Therefore, the risk of erroneous
deprivations should be considered to be very high. The last factor of the Mathews
standard is to determine the burden that additional procedures would impose. Ability
to pay determinations do introduce some difficulties, as was made clear after Bearden.
However, in the case of driver’s license suspensions, the ability to pay determination
could be made without ever having to appear before a judge.216 Therefore, the bur-
den of additional administrative procedures is not very high and Mr. Stinnie is owed
an opportunity to be heard under the Mathews standard.
This requirement for an opportunity to be heard does not dispense with all the
constitutional issues with the scheme, however. Procedural due process accounts for
210 See discussion supra Part II.
211 See discussion supra Section II.A.
212 See supra notes 99–102 and accompanying text.
213 See supra notes 103–15 and accompanying text.
214 See discussion supra Section II.B.
215 See discussion supra Section II.C.
216 See discussion supra Section II.D.
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the process that is owed to Mr. Stinnie, but it does not address whether or not it is
constitutional to suspend his license even if he lacks the ability to pay. The Fourteenth
Amendment provides two avenues to challenge the scheme at this point. The first
is the Equal Protection Clause and its principle that no class of persons should be
treated differently under the law.217 The second is the due process principle that the
relations of the state to defendants must be in accord with fundamental fairness.218
These principles actually converge in a line of cases beginning with Griffin, creating
a principle that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the state from punishing per-
sons for their poverty.219 The Department of Justice submitted a brief in Mr. Stinnie’s
case arguing exactly this point.220 Though the equal protection and due process prin-
ciples converge in that line of cases, they remain distinct, and Mr. Stinnie’s case is
best argued under the due process principle of fundamental fairness because the doc-
trine of fundamental fairness allows for the court to take into account the whole of
the scheme, including the way it in which it operates as a debt collection mechanism.221
When applying the fundamental fairness doctrine to this scheme, it is apparent
that the scheme is unconstitutional. Fundamental fairness is related to the doctrine
of substantive due process doctrine, and substantive due process has recently taken
a more forward-looking turn towards protecting subordinated classes.222 Fundamen-
tal fairness should be read in a similar way. Virginia’s scheme is fundamentally un-
fair in the way in which it deprives an indigent of an important property interest
without inquiry into his or her ability to pay. Additionally, the context of rising court
fees and fines and the widespread—and ineffectual—automatic license suspensions
bolster the argument that the scheme is fundamentally unfair.
For these reasons, the Virginia driver’s license scheme should be found to be
unconstitutional. Public awareness of this injustice has grown, and ideally the
Virginia legislature will step in and provide a remedy that addresses these concerns.223
Rule 1:24(d), enacted by the Virginia Supreme Court in November 2016, was a first
step in this process, and may help alleviate some of these injustices into the future by
allowing persons to apply for alternative methods of repayment, including a community
service option.224 A bill passed by the Virginia Senate that would eliminate automatic
suspensions would improve the situation for drivers placed in Mr. Stinnie’s position if
it became law.225 The public awareness raised by Mr. Stinnie’s suit and lawmakers’
willingness to address these concerns are hopeful signs of much-needed reform.
217 See supra notes 151–60 and accompanying text.
218 See supra notes 161–66 and accompanying text.
219 See supra notes 173–81 and accompanying text.
220 See generally Statement of Interest of the United States, supra note 46.
221 See discussion supra Section III.B.
222 See supra notes 189–202 and accompanying text.
223 See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
224 See VA. SUP. CT. R. 1:24(d).
225 See Martz, supra note 53.
